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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Timothy A. Kellis appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and course of proceedings 
underlying Kellis’ convictions as follows: 
Kellis was initially charged with ten counts of lewd and 
lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18–
1508, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, I.C. § 18–1506, for 
misconduct with teenage boys, much of which occurred at a Boy 
Scout camp where Kellis was a staff member.  Subsequently, one 
of the ten lewd conduct counts was amended to attempted lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen, I.C. §§ 18–306 and 18–1508. 
Kellis pleaded not guilty to all charges and went to trial before a 
jury.  He was found guilty of all counts.  The district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of life with fifteen years fixed for each 
of the nine counts of lewd conduct, fifteen years with five years 
fixed for the count of attempted lewd conduct, and twenty-five years 
with fifteen years fixed for each of the two counts of sexual abuse. 
 
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 813-814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1175-1176 (Ct. App. 
2010).  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Kellis’ convictions and sentences. 
(Id.) 
Kellis then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, and then, through 
appointed counsel, an amended petition.  See Kellis v. State, Docket No. 41034, 
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 672 (Idaho App., August 15, 2014).  In the 
amended petition, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was ineffective in numerous 
respects, including for: failing to adequately investigate prior allegations of sexual 
misconduct made by the victims, failing to obtain an expert witness to investigate 
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the allegations made by the victims and to analyze the credibility of those 
allegations, failing to utilize an expert witness to determine whether physical 
evidence could be recovered from the victims’ sleeping bags, and failing to 
prevent or rebut evidence that Kellis provided alcohol to one of the victims.  Id., 
pp.4-8.  The district court summarily dismissed Kellis’ petition on the ground that 
he failed to present facts adequate to support any of his claims.  Id.  On appeal, 
Kellis asserted that the district court provided inadequate notice of its grounds for 
dismissal.  Id., p.4.  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.  Id., 
pp.4-8. 
Kellis then filed a successive post-conviction petition.  (R., Vol. I, pp.11-
44.)  The district court construed Kellis’ petition as asserting that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to: (1) review recordings of the investigating officer’s 
interviews with the victims in order to analyze the interviewing techniques utilized 
by the officer; (2) investigate evidence that the victims previously made other 
allegations of sexual misconduct; (3) obtain an expert witness to demonstrate 
bias in the state’s witnesses; (4) allege double jeopardy; (5) contact witnesses 
who would corroborate Kellis’ testimony; and (6) argue that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.  (R., Vol. I, pp.165-168.) 
 The district court appointed counsel to represent Kellis on the successive 
petition.  (R., Vol. I, p.115.)  However, after the state filed its motion for summary 
dismissal (R., Vol. I, pp.116-135), Kellis’ counsel, citing I.R.P.C. 1.16 (note 3), 3.1, 
and 3.3, filed a motion to withdraw (R., Vol. I, pp.148-149).  Contemporaneously 
with this motion, Kellis filed a motion requesting that the district court appoint 
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substitute, or “conflict,” counsel.  (R., Vol. I, pp.150-156.)  After a hearing, the 
district court denied both motions.  (R., Vol. I, pp.158-163; Tr., p.22, L.9 – p.25, 
L.14.) 
 The district court then entered a notice of intent to dismiss Kellis’ 
successive petition on the ground that Kellis failed to demonstrate “sufficient 
reason,” pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908, why his claims were not adequately raised in 
his initial post-conviction petition.  (R., Vol. I, pp.164-170.)  Kellis’ appointed 
counsel then filed a renewed motion to withdraw, citing the same grounds she 
raised in her initial motion.  (R., Vol. I, pp.199-200.)  Kellis filed a motion for re-
consideration of the district court’s order denying his motion for substitute, or 
“conflict,” counsel.  (R., Vol. I, pp.171-177.)  Without conducting an additional 
hearing, the court granted Kellis’ appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, but 
denied Kellis’ motion for re-consideration of its order denying Kellis’ request for 
substitute counsel.  (R., Vol. I, pp.193-196, 206-207.)    
 Kellis then filed a pro se amended successive post-conviction petition, 
which contained two ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.  (R., Vol. 
II, pp.229-266.)  Kellis asserted his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise double jeopardy and subject matter jurisdiction claims on direct appeal.  
(Id.)  The district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss these additional two 
claims on the ground that they were both barred by I.C. § 19-4908 and the 
doctrine of res judicata.  (R., Vol. III, pp.502-511.)  The district court then 
summarily dismissed all eight of Kellis’ successive post-conviction petition claims 
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on the ground that they were all barred by I.C. § 19-4908 and the doctrine of res 
judicata.  (R., Vol. III, pp.502-532, 543-547.) 
 Kellis timely appealed.  (R., Vol. III, pp.537-540.)  The district court 
appointed counsel to represent Kellis on the appeal. (R., Vol. III, pp.549-550.)   
However, the Idaho Supreme Court later granted appointed counsel’s motion to 









 Kellis states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the District Court err by denying Appellant’s Motion for 
Appointment of Conflict Counsel[?] 
 
B. Did the District Court err when it failed to hold a hearing, as 
provided by I.R.C.P. Rule 11(b)(2), after appointed post[-
]conviction counsel Deborah L. McCormick filed a renewed 
motion requesting leave to withdraw, and when it was clear 
that the attorney-client relationship had broke down[?] 
 
C. Did the District Court err by dismissing Appellant’s Amended 
 Second Petition by denying Appellant’s Motions to Depose 
 by Written Examination and for Authorization to Employ an 
 Investigator, thus, denying this Appellant the opportunity to 
 obtain the necessary evidence in support of his claims[?] 
 
D. Did the District Court err by dismissing Appellant’s Amended 
 Second Petition after appellant provided sufficient reason to 
 file the claims as per I.C. § 19-4908[?] 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to appoint conflict counsel? 
 
2. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court erred by declining to 
conduct an additional hearing on Kellis’ appointed counsel’s renewed 
motion to withdraw? 
 
3. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to conduct discovery? 
 
4. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court erred by summarily 













Kellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion To Appoint Conflict Counsel 
 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to appoint conflict counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.)  Kellis’ argument 
fails because a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or statutory right 
to substitute counsel, and because in any event, Kellis did not allege an actual 
conflict with his appointed counsel that either necessitated the appointment of 
substitute counsel, or required the district court to inquire about any potential 
conflict. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In a post-conviction proceeding, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a request 
for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court.”  
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) (citation 
omitted).  “[T]he decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies within the 
discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012).  On 
review, the appellate court must determine whether the district court “acted within 
the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to 
its specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 




C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Kellis’ 
Motion To Appoint Conflict Counsel 
 
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment 
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931).  The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all “critical stages” of 
the adversarial proceedings against him.  Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 
149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citations omitted).  Although this right encompasses 
the first direct appeal, it does not extend to post-conviction proceedings.  
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  See also Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 394, 327 P.3d 
365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)) 
(“‘[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.’”); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013) 
(“[T]he right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not a constitutional 
right.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).   
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, a post-conviction petition is a 
civil proceeding and so provides the clearest example of a proceeding to which 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the correlative right to conflict-free 
counsel, do not apply.  See Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804.  Because 
Kellis lacks a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-conviction 
petition, the district court also had no free-standing duty to inquire into any 
alleged conflict of interest.  Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343-344, 160 
P.3d 1275, 1278-1279 (Ct. App. 2007) (procedures required to rule on a request 
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for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings).   
Prior to its repeal in 2013, I.C. § 19-856 provided that a district court could, 
for “good cause,” assign a substitute attorney to represent a criminal defendant 
or post-conviction petitioner.  I.C. § 19-856 (repealed by S.L. 2013, ch. 220, § 6, 
eff. July 1, 2013).  While the Idaho appellate courts did not define the parameters 
of what constituted “good cause” for substitution of counsel in a post-conviction 
proceeding, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that “determining whether 
good cause exists to substitute counsel for a criminal defendant differs from 
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for an applicant for 
post-conviction relief” because a post-conviction petitioner, unlike a criminal 
defendant, has no right to counsel.  Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 344, 160 P.3d at 
1279. 
The state asserts that because there is no constitutional right to post-
conviction counsel, and because I.C. § 19-856 has been repealed, a post-
conviction petitioner does not have a constitutional or statutory right to substitute 
counsel, even upon a showing of “good cause.”  However, even assuming, 
arguendo, either that the repeal of I.C. § 19-856 did not change the legal 
landscape for post-conviction petitioners seeking substitute counsel,1 or that a 
post-conviction petitioner has the right to conflict-free counsel once counsel has 
                                                 
1 The Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that the legal landscape for criminal 
defendants and post-conviction petitioners seeking to substitute counsel did not 
change following the repeal of I.C. § 19-856 because the Idaho appellate courts’ 
“treatment of the statute was premised largely upon Sixth Amendment principles.”  





actually been appointed, Kellis has still failed to show he is entitled to relief.  
Kellis failed to allege either an actual conflict, or even a “vague, unspecified 
possibility of conflict” that would require a district court to conduct an inquiry in a 
criminal case.  Hall, 155 Idaho at 619, 315 P.3d at 807 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162, 168–169 (2002)).    
Instead, in his motion requesting that the district court appoint conflict 
counsel, Kellis appeared to confuse the concept of actual conflict of interest with 
personal “conflicts” that may arise between a client and his own counsel.  To 
demonstrate an actual conflict, a defendant or post-conviction petitioner must 
show: (1) that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests; and (2) that 
the conflict had an adverse effect.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); 
Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915, 921, 332 P.3d 827, 833 (2014).  In his motion, 
Kellis did not allege that his appointed counsel actively represented conflicting 
interests, or that any conflict had any adverse effect on his counsel’s 
representation.  (See R., Vol. I, pp.150-156.)  Instead, Kellis alleged only that his 
successive post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
communicate with him and for failing to amend his successive petition in the 
manner he requested.2 (Id.)    
Kellis did not have a constitutional or statutory right to substitute counsel. 
In any event, Kellis failed to allege an actual conflict of interest or even a “vague, 
                                                 
2 The state disputes any implied assertion that by initially appointing counsel, the 
district court necessarily and affirmatively concluded that Kellis’ successive post-
conviction claims were potentially meritorious, and that Kellis was thus entitled to 
substitute counsel once the district court granted appointed counsel’s motion to 
withdraw from the case.  In any event, it does not appear that Kellis made such 
an argument to the district court. 
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unspecified possibility of conflict,” that may have required further inquiry from the 
district court.  Kellis has therefore failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to appoint conflict counsel.   
 
II. 
Kellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Declining To Conduct 




Kellis contends that the district court erred by declining to conduct a 
hearing on his appointed counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.11-13.)  A review of the record and the plain language of I.R.C.P. 
11(b)(2) reveals that the district court was not required to conduct an additional 
hearing before ruling on Kellis’ appointed counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw.  
In any event, even if the district court erred, any such error was harmless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of court rules presents a question of law over which 
appellate courts exercise free review.  See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 
P.3d 998, 1001 (2010) (interpretation of rules of civil procedure given free review) 
(citation omitted). 
 
C. Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) Did Not Require The District Court 
 To Conduct An Additional Hearing Before Ruling On Kellis’ Appointed
 Counsel’s Renewed Motion To Withdraw 
 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) provides, in relevant part: 
 
 [N]o attorney may withdraw as an attorney of record for any party to 
an action without first obtaining leave and order of the court upon a 
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motion filed with the court, and a hearing on the motion after notice 
to all parties to the action, including the client of the withdrawing 
attorney.  Leave to withdraw as a counsel of record may be granted 
by the court for good cause and upon such conditions or sanctions 
as will prevent any delay in determination and disposition of the 
pending action and the rights of the parties. 
 
 Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2), no attorney may withdraw from 
representation of a client in a post-conviction proceeding until a hearing on the 
attorney’s motion to withdraw is conducted by the district court.   
In September 2014, Kellis’ appointed counsel filed a motion requesting 
leave to withdraw.  (R., Vol. I, pp.148-149.)  In support of the motion, Kellis’ 
counsel cited I.R.P.C. 1.16 (note 3), 3.1, and 3.3.  (Id.)  The district court 
conducted a hearing on this motion before ultimately denying it.  (R., Vol. I, 
pp.158-163; Tr., p.22, L.9 – p.25, L.14.)  The court concluded that appointed 
counsel demonstrated good cause to withdraw, but that there were, at that time, 
“no conditions that would ‘prevent any delay in determination and disposition of 
the pending action and the rights of the parties.’”  (R., Vol. I, pp.160-161 (quoting 
I.R.C.P 11(b)(2)).)  The court explained that because it was entering a notice of 
intent to dismiss the underlying petition simultaneously with its order denying 
Kellis’ appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, there was “insufficient time” to 
stay the case, as would be required by I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) if appointed counsel was 
permitted to withdraw.  (R., Vol. I, p.161.) 
In the next two months, Kellis filed, pro se, a response to the district 
court’s notice of intent to dismiss his petition (R., Vol. I, pp.178-190), and a 
motion to reconsider his motion to appoint conflict counsel (R., Vol. I, pp.171-
177).  Then, in December 2014, Kellis’ appointed counsel filed a “renewed” 
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motion requesting leave to withdraw.  (R., Vol. I, pp.199-200.)  The renewed 
motion relied on the same grounds as the initial motion – I.R.P.C. 1.16 (note 3), 
3.1, and 3.3.3  (Id.)  The district court granted this motion without conducting an 
additional hearing.  (R., Vol. I, pp.206-207.)   
The plain language of I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) did not require the district court to 
conduct an additional hearing upon Kellis’ appointed counsel’s “renewed” motion 
to withdraw.  Counsel’s renewed motion was not a new, distinct, or separate 
motion.  Instead, it repeated the grounds set forth in her initial motion.  The 
district court had already concluded, after a hearing at which Kellis participated, 
that these grounds constituted “good cause” for counsel’s withdrawal from the 
case.  In compliance with I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2), appointed counsel thus did not 
withdraw until she obtained leave and order from the court and provided notice to 
Kellis, and until the district court conducted a hearing, after which it concluded 
that good cause existed for counsel to withdraw.   
Kellis has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court violated 
I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) by permitting appointed counsel to withdraw without conducting 




                                                 
3 In the renewed motion, appointed counsel also argued that Kellis’ letter to the 
court indicating that he planned to file pro se pleadings “can be construed as a 
discharge [of appointed counsel].”   (R., Vol. I, p.199.)   In granting the renewed 
motion, the district court did not address this alternative argument that Kellis had 
already discharged his appointed counsel.  (R., Vol. I, pp.206-207.) 
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D. Even If The District Court Erred By Permitting Counsel To Withdraw 
Without Conducting An Additional Hearing Following Appointed Counsel’s 
Renewed Motion To Withdraw, Any Such Error Was Harmless 
 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that a district court “must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties.”  See also McClure Engineering, Inc. v. Channel 
5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 955, 155 P.3d 1189, 1154 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
an attorney’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of I.R.C.P 11(b)(2) 
and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(a) did not invalidate the subsequent withdrawal order 
because the aggrieved party failed to demonstrate that the deficient notice 
prejudiced them in some way).   
In this case, even if the district court erred by permitting Kellis’ appointed 
counsel to withdraw without conducting an additional hearing following the 
renewed motion to withdraw, any such error was harmless pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
61 because Kellis has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
Kellis had ample opportunity to be heard in response to both appointed 
counsel’s initial motion to withdraw, and the renewed motion to withdraw.  Kellis 
was present, via telephone, at the hearing on appointed counsel’s initial motion 
to withdraw, and had the opportunity to present argument at that hearing.  (Tr., 
p.22, L.9 – p.25, L.14.)  After appointed counsel filed her renewed motion to 
withdraw, Kellis received notice and filed a response to that motion.  (R., Vol. I, 
pp.201-203.)  On appeal, Kellis has not attempted to argue how an additional 
hearing on the renewed motion would have resulted in a different outcome.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)  Additionally, as discussed above, there is nothing in 
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the record to indicate that Kellis was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to 
substitute, or “conflict” counsel.         
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) did not require the district court to 
conduct an additional hearing before granting Kellis’ appointed counsel’s 
renewed motion to withdraw.  In any event, even if the district court erred, any 




Kellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion To Conduct Discovery 
 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to conduct discovery in the successive post-conviction proceeding.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15.)  A review of the record reveals that the district court 
acted well within its discretion to deny Kellis’ discovery motions. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the 
sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135 
Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) (citing Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 
319, 912 P.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)). On review, the appellate court must 
determine whether the district court “acted within the boundaries of its discretion, 
consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and 
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whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Lafferty, 125 
Idaho at 381, 870 P.2d at 1340. 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining Kellis’ 
 Motion To Conduct Discovery 
 
Discovery generally available in civil proceedings is not available in post-
conviction proceedings “unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court."  
I.C.R. 57(b); see also Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 50, 577 P.2d 24, 29 
(1978); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 
1999).  “In order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant must 
identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why 
discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application.” State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003), (citing 
Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-403, 973 P.2d at 754-755). 
“Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant’s substantial rights, 
the district court is not required to order discovery.”  Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 
605, 21 P.3d at 927.  Moreover, discovery is not a mechanism for finding out if 
evidence supports claims, and this “fishing expedition” discovery is discouraged.  
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(“‘Fishing expedition’ discovery should not be allowed. The UPCPA provides a 
forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances.”). 
In this case, after the district court filed its initial notice of intent to dismiss 
Kellis’ successive post-conviction claims on the ground that the claims were 
barred by I.C. § 19-4908, Kellis filed three motions requesting that the court 
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permit him to conduct discovery.  (R., Vol. I, pp.212-223, 227-228.)  Specifically, 
Kellis requested: (1) that the court appoint a private investigator “to locate and 
interview numerous witnesses or potential witnesses”; (2) that he be permitted to 
depose his trial counsel; and (3) that the respondent provide certain transcripts. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.212-218.)   
The district court denied these motions.  (R., Vol. II, pp.383-389.)   The 
court correctly recognized that each of Kellis’ discovery requests were aimed 
towards developing the merits of his successive post-conviction claims.  (R., Vol. 
II, pp.386-387.)  Thus, these discovery requests, and the information Kellis 
sought to obtain, would not have helped Kellis overcome I.C. § 19-4908, the 
procedural bar that was the basis of the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss 
and subsequent summary dismissal order.  Because the district court did not 
reach the merits of Kellis’ claims, Kellis cannot show that his merits-based 
discovery requests were necessary to protect his substantial rights. 
Kellis has failed to demonstrate that his requested discovery would have 
assisted him in overcoming the procedural bar of I.C. § 19-4908.  He has 
therefore failed to show that the requests were necessary to protect his 









Kellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-25.)  Specifically, Kellis appears 
to contend that the district court erred in concluding that his successive post-
conviction claims were barred by I.C. § 19-4908.  (Id.)  A review of the record 
reveals that the district court properly concluded that Kellis failed to show 
sufficient reason to justify a successive petition. 
 
B. Kellis’ Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Precluded By I.C. § 19-4908 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).    
A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible.  
I.C. § 19-4908 (claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally 
waived).  Only in cases where the petitioner can show “sufficient reason” why 
claims were “inadequately presented in the original case” may he have the 
opportunity to re-litigate them.  Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 
978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 19-4908. 
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Kellis argued that his successive petition was justified because: (1) his 
initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective in numerous respects, including for 
failing to raise certain claims that Kellis requested to be raised; and (2) he did not 
personally receive certain recordings of investigators’ interviews with the victims 
until Jul 18, 2013, after the first post-conviction proceeding concluded.  (R., Vol. 
III, pp.395-487, 533-536; Appellant’s brief, pp.15-25.)   
The district court properly rejected these arguments and summarily 
dismissed Kellis’ petition.  (R., Vol. III, pp.512-533, 543-548.)  The court  correctly 
recognized that Kellis’ argument that his filing of a successive petition was 
justified by alleged ineffective assistance of his initial post-conviction counsel was 
precluded by Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 392-395, 327 P.3d 365, 368-371 
(2014).  (R., Vol. III, pp.517-522, 543-544.)  In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court 
overruled prior precedent and held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel cannot constitute “sufficient reason” for filing a successive petition 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.  Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392-395, 327 P.3d at 368-371.  
The Court recognized that because, as the United States Supreme Court has 
held, there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel in such proceedings, even as a means of attempting to overcome state 
procedural hurdles.  Id. 
The district court also correctly rejected Kellis’ argument that his late 
receipt of certain recordings and other evidence justified the filing of his 
successive petition.  (R., Vol. I, pp.165-166; Vol III, pp.514, 528-529.)  While the 
19 
 
discovery of “new evidence” can theoretically constitute “sufficient reason” to file 
a successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908, see Lopez v. State, 157 Idaho 
795, 798, 339 P.3d 1199, 1202 (Ct. App. 2014), Kellis’ assertion that he was not 
able to personally review recordings of investigators’ interviews is not a “new 
evidence” claim.  Instead, this assertion is essentially a re-framing of claims that 
Kellis raised in his initial post-conviction petition – that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to review these recordings, and for failing to investigate 
evidence that the victims previously made other allegations of sexual 
misconduct.   Kellis has not alleged that his trial counsel (or initial post-conviction 
counsel) was somehow precluded from obtaining or reviewing this evidence.  A 
pro se successive post-conviction petitioner cannot circumvent the I.C. § 19-4908 
procedural bar simply by asserting that he personally, in a pro se capacity, 
accessed certain evidence for the first time during the successive post-conviction 
proceeding. 
Kellis has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding 
that his successive post-conviction petition was barred by I.C. § 19-4908.   This 
Court should therefore affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of Kellis’ 
successive petition. 
 
C. In The Alternative, Each Of Kellis’ Successive Post-Conviction Claims Are 
Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata  
  
“In post-conviction proceedings, Idaho appellate courts have applied the 
related principles of res judicata to bar an attempt to raise, in an application for 
post-conviction relief, the same issue previously decided in a direct appeal.”  
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Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 797-98, 291 P.3d 474, 480-81 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citing State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210–11, 766 P.2d 678, 680–81 (1988); 
State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327, 330, 193 P.3d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 2008); 
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 439, 163 P.3d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 2007); 
LePage, 138 Idaho at 811, 69 P.3d at 1072).  “The doctrine of res judicata covers 
both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral 
estoppel).”  Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 
(2007) (citing Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)).  
“Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion applies.”  Id.  (citing D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 
P.2d 602, 605 (2000)). 
For claim preclusion (true res judicata) to bar a subsequent action there 
are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.  
Id. (citing Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nat’l Bank v. 
Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994)).   
In this case, the district court concluded, as an alternative basis for 
summary dismissal, that each of Kellis’ successive post-conviction claims was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  (R., Vol. III, pp.509-510, 530-531, 543-
545.)  On appeal, while Kellis has expressly declined to concede that his claims 
were barred by the res judicata doctrine (Appellant’s brief, p.25), he has provided 
no argument or authority supporting any implied proposition that the district court 
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erred by utilizing this ground for dismissal.4  “A party waives an issue on appeal if 
either authority or argument are lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 
335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).  The state asserts that the district court correctly 
applied the res judicata doctrine, and relies on the analysis of the district court for 
this proposition.  (See R., Vol. III, pp.509-510, 530-531, 543-545.)  This Court 
may affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of Kellis’ successive petition on 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order summarily dismissing Kellis’ successive petition for post-conviction relief. 




       _/s/ Mark W. Olson_____ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
                                                 
4 Further, Kellis acknowledges on appeal that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt presents a 
convincing argument in regards to sufficient reason and res judicata.  As a [p]ro 
se litigant I am certain the [c]ourt is correct in their [sic] position and 
understanding of the law as well as how it applies to this current case.”  
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